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SELECTIVE PACIFISM, RETROACTIVITY AND H. R. 832
INTRODUCTION
Interest in and claims for conscientious objector classification have
risen in proportion to opposition to American involvement in Southeast
Asia. Congress has traditionally recognized a privilege of conscientious
objection by requiring that an applicant be sincerely opposed to participat-
ing in war in any form because of religious training and belief.' In
Welsh v. United States,2 the Supreme Court redefined "religious
training and belief" and held that
[w]hat is necessary . . for a registrant's conscientious
objection to all war to be "religious" . . . is that this opposition
to war stem from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious
beliefs about what is right and wrong and that these beliefs
be held with the strength of traditional religious convic-
tions. . . . If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs
that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but
1. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 9. The Conscription Act of 1864
granted C.O. status to members of religious denominations "who . . . declare that they
are conscientiously opposed to the bearing of arms, and who are prohibited from doing
so by the rules and articles of said religious denominations . . . ." Id.
Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76 exempted the members of "any well-
organized religious sect or organization . . . whose existing creed or principles forbid
its members to participate in war in any form and whose religious convictions are
against war . . . . " Id.
Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885 deleted the 1917 statute's require-
ment of church membership and inserted the requirement of "religious training and be-
lief" from those "conscientiously opposed to war in any form."
Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604 resolved a conflict between United
States ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944), which allowed C.O. status to an
atheist and Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795
(1946), which held that conscientious objection must be related to belief in a deity. The
Act of 1948 required that
religious training and belief means an individual's belief in relation to a Su-
preme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation
but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views
or a merely personal code.
Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604.
Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (Supp. IV,
1968), formerly ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604 (1948). After the decision in United States
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), Congress deleted the requirement of "belief in a Supreme
Being" to constitute religious training and belief.
2. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). This was a plurality decision. Justice Black's opinion
was joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall. Justice Harlan concurred in
the result and Justices White and Stewart and the Chief Justice dissented. Justice Black-
mun took no part in the decision.
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that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to
refrain from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs
certainly occupy in the life of that individual "a place parallel
to that filled by . . . God" . . . . [S.]uch an individual
is as much entitled to a "religious" conscientious objector
exemption . . . as is someone who derives his conscientious
opposition to war from traditional religious convictions.8
With such an anomalous definition of religion, the Court was able to
save the statute from first amendment difficulties and reduce the con-
scientious objection criteria to sincerity and opposition to participation
in war in any form. The purpose of this note is to examine the "in any
form" requirement and to explore the possibility of and benefit from its
deletion from selective service law.
SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR STATUS IN THE COURTS
Claims for selective conscientious objection seem to fall into three
categories: those based on religious objections, e.g., the "just war"
doctrine; those based on moral, ethical or humanistic grounds; and those
based on legal grounds, e.g., that the war in Vietnam is illegal under
domestic or international law.
Selective Pacifism Based on Religion
Under the Welsh definition of religion, it no longer seems viable
to characterize the draft law as unconstitutional merely because it favors
religious belief over secular belief. Although Welsh affords exemption on
religious, moral or ethical grounds, the draft still favors "religious"
conscientious objection to all war over "religious" conscientious objection
to particular wars. This raises the question whether the conscription law
violates the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amend-
mentO or the equal protection doctrine inherent in the fifth amendment.'
These issues were presented to the Supreme Court in Negre v. Larsen'
and Gillette v. United States.7 Gillette believed he had a duty based on
3. Id. at 339-40 (emphasis added).
4. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the
federal government, but in Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Supreme Court
held that to deny equal protection was a violation of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.
6. 418 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437 (1971).
7. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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Humanism to abstain from involvement in unjust wars.' Gillette ex-
pressed willingness to fight in some wars, but because Gillette's pacifism
was selective, his claim for exemption was denied. He was ordered to
report for induction and refused induction. The second petitioner, Negre,
had been inducted and ordered to Vietnam. Negre, describing himself
as a devout Roman Catholic, believed he had a duty to discriminate
between just and unjust wars.9 Negre, like Gillette, objected to the
Vietnam war, but did not believe all wars were unjust. Neither petitioner's
sincerity was questioned.
The initial contention raised by the petitioners was that "participa-
tion in war in any form"1 meant participating in any form in a particular
war. The Court, speaking through Justice Marshall with Justice Douglas
dissenting, rejected this on the basis of legislative history and syntax.11
The petitioners further contended that favoring the traditional pacifist
sects over those faiths which distinguish between just and unjust wars
violated the establishment clause of the first amendment. The Court held
that this, if true, is allowable if the reasons for the alleged favoritism
are neutral and secular. Justice Marshall cited, as reasons for allowing an
exemption to C.O.'s, congressional recognition of the hopelessness of con-
verting a sincere conscientious objector into an effective fighting man,
duty to a moral power higher than the state, concern over the imposition
of conscription on conscientious objectors to war and respect for the
principle of supremacy of conscience. Though the Court conceded that
these were affirmative reasons which merely support the grant of an
exemption rather than demonstrate why exemption should be restricted
to total pacifists, it maintained that they are neutral with respect to
8. Gillette stated his views as follows:
I object to any assignment in the United States Armed Forces while this
unnecessary and unjust war is being waged, on the grounds of religious belief,
specifically "Humanism." This essentially means respect and love for man,
faith in his inherent goodness and perfectability, and confidence in his capability
to improve some of the human condition.
Id. at 463 (dissenting opinion).
9. The theological basis for this belief is explained by Pope John XXIII in Part II
Of PACEM IN TERRIs (1961).
Since the right to command is required by the moral order and has its
source in God, it follows that if civil authorities pass laws or command any-
thing opposed to the moral order and consequently contrary to the will of God,
neither the laws made nor the authority granted can be binding on the consciences
of citizens, since God has more right to be obeyed than men.
Id. at ff 51.
10. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (Supp.
IV, 1968), formerly ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604 (1948).
11. 401 U.S. 437, 443-45 (1971). The Court held that Congress has never intended
to allow selective C.O. status and that a straight forward grammatical reading of the law
can lead to only one conclusion: "in any form" modifies "war" and not "participation."
et al.: Selective Pacifism, Retroactivity and H.R. 832
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the establishment clause. It is submitted that under Welsh "duty to a
moral power higher than the state" is not secular and neutral as the
majority in Gillette contends. The same Court in Welsh held religious
training and belief to encompass moral beliefs. Welsh's conscientious
objector application reveals that the basis for his claim was a duty to a
moral power greater than the state:
I believe that human life is valuable in and of itself; in its living;
therefore I will not injure or kill another human being. This
belief (and corresponding "duty" to abstain from violence to-
ward another person) . . . is essential to every human
relation. I cannot . . . assume duties which I feel are immoral
and totally repugnant."
Apparently the Supreme Court believes "moral duty" to be religious
with respect to the first amendment when a total pacifist like Welsh
claims exemption, but secular when selective pacifists such as Gillette and
Negre are involved. A more confusing inconsistency is difficult to imagine.
The Court conceded that the establishment clause prohibits subtle
departures from neutrality, but then contended that the exempting pro-
visions focus on individual conscientious belief, not on sectarian affilia-
tion. It is submitted that this itself is a subtle departure from neutrality.
Certain sects such as the Quakers espouse a total pacifist position, 8
and the Jehovah's Witnesses consider their men workers "ordained"
and rightfully exempt from military service. 4 Catholicism includes the
"just war" doctrine in its teachings, and reasons that to participate in
what is conscientiously considered to be an unjust war is sinful.' 5 In these
three faiths, individual conscientious belief is a product of sectarian
affiliation. When a question is asked concerning a person's beliefs, he
does not reply by stating the length and breadth of his beliefs; it is
sufficient to identify beliefs by divulging his sectarian affiliation. If it
is true that individual conscientious belief connotes sectarian affiliation,
to allow exemption to only those who object to all war would seem to
be a subtle departure from neutrality and violative of the establishment
clause of the first amendment because exemption would indeed be based
on sectarian affiliation.
To demonstrate why conscientious objection should be limited to
12. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343 (1970) (emphasis added).
13. M. HIRST, THE QUAKERS IN PEACE AND WAR (1923).
14. M. COLE, QuALnID TO BE MINISTERS (1955).
15. Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World, § 16, THE Docu-
MENTS OF VATICAN II at 213-14 (1966).
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total pacifists, the Court professed the government's need for manpower
and its interest in maintaining a fair system for determining who serves
when not all serve.'" The manpower reason is given no documentation by
the Court.'" The Court supports the "fairness" reason by arguing that a
limitless variety of beliefs are subsumable under the rubric
"objection to a particular war." . . . [They] may more
likely be political and nonconscientious than otherwise. The
difficulties of sorting the two with a sure hand are consider-
able. . . . In short, it is not at all obvious in theory what sorts
of objections should be deemed sufficient to excuse an
objector . 1.. ..
But in reality, it seems that the basis for conscientious exemption would
be the same although the factual bases will be more particularized and
contemporary because they relate to the war at hand. In light of the
directive from the Selective Service System to all local draft boards
following Welsh, it would seem that the same test used for all-war
conscientious objectors would be also applicable to selective conscientious
objectors. Local Board Memorandum #107"9 states that the "primary
test" should be the "sincerity with which the beliefs are held; the beliefs
need not be based on religion but must be held with the strength of
traditional religious convictions." But, as Justice Marshall suggests, a
selective objector's factual basis for objection to a particular war could
be one which most regard as mistaken.2" Under United States v. Seeger,"
the truth of these beliefs would not be open to question, the only issue
being whether the beliefs are truly held. This could be changed for
selective C.O.'s to require that there be a substantial basis in fact that the
belief is true. This test, coupled with the inherent skepticism of draft
boards when faced with a claim for conscientious objection, should allow
16. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455 (1971).
17. It is quite probable that there would be a marked increase in the number of
draft registrants enjoying conscientious objector status if it were allowed, but this
deficit could be remedied by implementing the measures proposed to attract an all-
volunteer army. Hochstadt, The Right to Exemption from Military Service of a Con-
scientious Objector to a Particular War, 3 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 1, 42-45
(1967).
The United States military requires more logistic support for its combat troops than
any other army in the world. Other nations' armies are made up mostly of combatants
and the logistic support is handled by civilians. If the United States were to do this, far
fewer men would be required. NEWS WEEK, March 29, 1971, at 112.
18. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455 (1971).
19. Selective Service System Local Board Memorandum # 107, July 6, 1970.
20. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455 (1971).
21. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
et al.: Selective Pacifism, Retroactivity and H.R. 832
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the present administrative apparatus to screen out the spurious from the
sincere claimant under the present guidelines enunciated in selective
service directives.
In order for the local board to find that a registrant's moral and
ethical beliefs are . . . held with the strength of traditional
religious conviction, the local board should consider the nature
and history of the process by which he acquired such beliefs.
The registrant must demonstrate that his moral or ethical con-
victions were gained through training, study, contemplation,
or other activity, comparable in rigor and dedication to the
processes by which traditional religious convictions are
formulated. The registrant must show that these moral and
ethical convictions, once acquired, have directed his life in the
way traditional religious convictions of equal strength, depth
and duration have directed the lives of those whose beliefs are
clearly founded in traditional religious conviction.2
The Court concluded its establishment clause holding by explaining
that its decision did not mean that Congress could not exempt con-
scientious objectors to a particular war if it chose to do so, but only
that there was a neutral secular justification to not do so. It is ironic
that in the paragraph immediately preceeding the acknowledgment that
the availability of selective C.O. status is subject to Congress' whim, the
Court counsels that
[s]hould it be thought that those who go to war are chosen
unfairly or capriciously, then a mood of bitterness and cynicism
might corrode the spirit of public service and the values of
willing performance of a citizen's duties .... 2
In its free exercise discussion, the Court admits that the disallowance
of an exemption for selective conscientious objectors has an impact upon
the free exercise of religions which embrace the doctrine of a "just war,"
but the Court found that
our analysis . . . shows that the impact of conscription on
objectors to a particular war is far from unjustified. The
conscription laws, applied to such persons . . . are not
designed to interfere with any religious ritual or practice,
and do not work a penalty against any theological position.2
22. Selective Service System Local Board Memorandum # 107, July 6, 1970.
23. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 460 (1971).
24. Id. at 462.
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It seems that the majority failed to recognize the difference between the
intent and the effect of the law. The effect of the selective service act is
to discriminate against those who believe in the "just war" doctrine. To
say that the denial of selective conscientious objection does not work a
penalty is to ignore the thousands of young draft registrants whose con-
sciences have forced them to choose federal prison over service in the
military. 5 In the words of Justice Douglas, "the welfare of the
single human soul was the ultimate test of the vitality of the First
Amendment.''26
The petitioners in Gillette finally claimed that the due process clause
of the fifth amendment makes denial of a selective C.O. exemption uncon-
stitutional because the distinction drawn between objectors to all war
and objectors to a particular war is arbitrary and invidious and dis-
criminates in contravention of the equal protection doctrine inherent in
the fifth amendment. The majority denied this claim for the same
reasons it denied the claim that selective conscientious objection
violated the establishment clause-the neutral secular reasons which the
Court held to justify Congress' distinguishing between religious C.O.'s
and religious selective C.O's.
Welsh and Gillette seem to foreclose any religious, moral or ethical
approach to selective conscientious objection. The only available alterna-
tive in the courts, therefore, seems to be the challenge that the war is
illegal under domestic or international law."
Selective Pacifism Based on Legal Grounds
The grounds for claiming a war is illegal are very similar to the
reasons a religious objector believes a war is unjust. 8 The Charter of
the International Military Tribunal specifies three types of war crimes:
(a) Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation
of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participa-
tion in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of
25. For a sensitive and articulate treatment of the moral dilemma which faces the
selective C.O., see W. GAYLIN, IN THE SERVICE OF THEIR COUNTRY-WAR RESISTERS IN
PRISON (1970).
26. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 469 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
27. But see O'Brien, Selective Conscientious Objection and International Law, 56
GEO. L.J. 1080, 1111-19 (1968).
28. Compare Murray, War and Conscience in A CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES: THE CASE
FoR SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTIONS 19 (1968) with O'Brien, The Nuremberg
Principles in A CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES: THE CASE FOR SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OB-
JECTION 140 (1968).
et al.: Selective Pacifism, Retroactivity and H.R. 832
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any of the foregoing;
(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs
of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to,
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any
other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the
seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property,
wanton destruction of cities, towns, villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity;
(c) Crimes Against Humanity: namely, murder, extermina-
tion, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts com-
mitted against any civilian population, before or during the
war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of
the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 9
The Charter also provides that there shall be no immunity for heads of
state, nor will a person be excused if he was following orders."0
The so-called Nuremberg selective objector usually argues that the
crimes specified in the Charter are binding on the United States because
article VI of the Constitution holds international treaties to be the
supreme law of the land.2' These Nuremberg principles are accepted as
binding norms of international law. 2 The U.S. Army's ostensible ad-
herence to the Nuremberg principles is evidenced in the Army Field Manual
27-10, The Law of Land Warfare.8 The Nuremberg objector contends
29. 59 Stat. 1546, 1547, art. 6 (1945).
30. 59 Stat. 1546, 1548, art. 7-8 (1945).
31. Article VI of the Constitution provides that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States made in Pursuance there-
of; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges of every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
32. See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The Supreme Court held
that :
International law is a part of our law and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice . . . as often as questions of right depending upon it
are duly presented for . . . determination. For this purpose, if there is no
treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations ....
Id. at 700. See also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); Whitney v. Robert-
son, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
33. U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL No. F.M. 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE (1956).
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that these laws are being violated in Vietnam "as a matter of policy,""
and that by becoming a member of the armed forces, he could be ordered
to participate in these violations. Therefore, to keep from becoming a war
criminal, he must refuse induction into the armed forces. In effect, the
argument is that moral considerations which are completely divorced
from religion compel disloyalty to certain policies of the state.8"
Only one case can be found where a court allowed the defendant to
raise the illegality of the Vietnam war as a defense. In May of 1967, Capt.
Howard B. Levy was court-martialed at Fort Jackson, South Carolina
for willfully disobeying an order to train Special Forces medical aides. 6
Capt. Levy contended this order was unlawful because the knowledge
gained by the "Green Beret" medics would be utilized in an unlawful
war for unlawful purposes. The trial officer, Col. Edward V. Brown,
ruled that the Army would acquit Capt. Levy if he could prove that the
United States was committing war crimes in Vietnam as a matter of
policy. The defense proffered testimony in private session that "Green
Beret" medics were engaging in criminal activities, but at the close of the
trial, Col. Brown ruled that while the defense had evidenced specific
instances of needless brutality, it had not shown this to be military
policy. There was no evidence that the medical aides would render the
order illegal by engaging in war crimes or in some way prostituting their
medical training by employing it in crimes against humanity. Ironically,
while the Army permitted Capt. Levy to attempt to show war crimes to
be a matter of policy, the civilian courts have uniformly declined to
consider as a defense to a prosecution for refusing military induction
whether military actions in a particular war violate international or
domestic law." They have held that it is a political question,"" that the
34. In the court-martial proceedings against Capt. Howard B. Levy at Fort
Jackson, South Carolina, for Capt. Levy's refusal to instruct "Green Beret" medics,
Judge Col. Edward V. Brown ruled that he would acquit Capt. Levy if the defense
could prove that the United States was committing war crimes in South Vietnam as a
matter of policy. Washington Post, May 18, 1967, § A, at 1, col. 6.
35. Silva, The Constitution, the Conscientious Objector, and the "Just War," 75
DIcK. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1970).
36. Levy v. Resor, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399 (1967).
37. Smith v. United States, 424 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1970) ; Rusk v. United States,
419 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1970) ; United States v. Rehfield, 416 F.2d 273, 275 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 996 (1970) ; Kemp v. United States, 415 F.2d 1185, 1188
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 969 (1970) ; United States v. Pratt, 412 F.2d 426,
427 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 400 U.S. 805 (1970) ; Simmons v. United States, 406
F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 982 (1969) ; United States v. Prince, 398
F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 946 (1968) ; United States v. Mitchell, 246 F.
Supp. 875, 898-99 (D. Conn. 1965), aff'd, 392 F.Zd 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 972 (1967).
38. Velvel v. Nixon, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968), af'd, 415 F.2d 236 (10th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970) ; Holmes v. United States, 387 F.2d 781
et al.: Selective Pacifism, Retroactivity and H.R. 832
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suit was an uncontested suit against the sovereign United States and
therefore unmaintainable 9 or that the particular plaintiff presenting the
question had no standing to raise it." Recently, however, two cases
have bypassed these three procedural defenses. In Orlando v. Laird,4 1 it
was recognized that a serviceman under orders to report for shipment
to Vietnam had standing to challenge the constitutionality of an un-
declared war. The court then distinguished questioning the wisdom of,
or seeking to arrest, combat action as purely political from the justiciable
issue of determining whether a political decision has been made by the
agency properly authorized to make it. The court ruled that Congress
had impliedly declared war by amending the Selective Service Act,
providing veteran's benefits for soldiers of the Vietnam era and voting
huge appropriations to sustain and extend combat activity.
In Mottola v. Nixon," the question of whether the Vietnam war
was being waged by and under the authority of the branch of govern-
ment in which the power is constitutionally vested received its most
extensive treatment. Three military reservists sued to enjoin the Pre-
sident from ordering United States military personnel into Cambodia,
and sued to obtain a judgment declaring that the plaintiffs had a right
to refuse to participate in an illegal and unconstitutional war. The
Government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter because 1) it was a non-justiciable political question, 2) the
plaintiffs lacked standing to raise the question and 3) the sovereign had
not consented to be sued. The court ruled the reservists had standing to
raise the question, holding that although the alleged illegality of the
Vietnam war cannot be raised as a defense to prosecution for refusal
to submit to induction, it may be raised by someone who, although not
yet called up to go to Vietnam, is ever vulnerable and subject to such
orders. The court then ruled that sovereign immunity is no bar to an
action challenging the Vietnam war power of the President because
the plaintiffs alleged that the President, although purporting to act in
(7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 936 (1968); Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967); Luftig v. McNamara, 252 F. Supp.
819 (D.D.C. 1966), affd, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945
(1967). See also United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass.), appeal dismissed,
390 U.S. 267 (1970).
39. E.g., Luftig v. McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 1966); Velvel v. Nixon,
287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968).
40. Velvel v. Nixon, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968) ; Kalish v. United States, 411
F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969); Ashton v. United States, 404
F.2d 95, 97 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 960 (1969) ; United States v. Bolton,
192 F.2d 805, 806 (2d Cir. 1951).
41. 317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
42. 318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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the name of the sovereign, had exceeded his constitutional authority. In
such a case, the relief plaintiffs request does not require any affirmative
action but merely requires the President cease his unauthorized continu-
ance of the war.
The "political question" issue was settled by distinguishing, as
political, a challenge to a constitutionally authorized administrative deci-
sion from the justiciable issue of whether an agency was constitutionally
authorized to make the decision itself. The plaintiffs could not challenge
the wisdom of the Vietnam war, but could question the President's power
to wage it without a declaration from Congress.
The court reached no decision on the main issue since the Govern-
ment had not filed responsive pleadings directed to the constitutional
question. The court acknowledged the "implied congressional declara-
tion" decision in Orlando, but noted that
a strong case can be made for the proposition that compliance
with the Constitution of the United States and its plain provi-
sion that the power to declare war lies, not in the President, but
in Congress . . . that compliance calls for nothing less than
what the Constitution plainly says-a declaration of war by
the Congress or at least an equally explicit congressional ex-
pression . . . that unless the President receives, upon his
request or otherwise, such a declaratory consent, either general
or limited, as soon as reasonably possible, any undeclared war
becomes a usurpation by the President or an abdication by
Congress-or, perhaps both."
The court denied the Government's motion to dismiss and directed that
it file responsive pleadings.
It seems certain from Gillette that selective conscientious objection
will not be allowed on moral, ethical or religious grounds; however, it
would appear that there is a possibility that the President is not con-
stitutionally afithorized to wage this war without a declaration from
Congress. If it were decided that the Vietnam war is unconstitutional
or even that selective pacifism should be allowed, this would be of
benefit to those presently eligible for the draft, although it would seem
to be of little or no importance to those who have already been forced
either to compromise their consciences in the military, to submit to federal
prosecution and prison for refusing induction or to flee the country to
avoid the military and federal prisons. If the allowance of selective
43. Id. at 553.
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conscientious objection or a declaration that the war in Vietnam is
domestically or internationally illegal is to be meaningful, it must be
retroactive to those in the military, those in prison and those in exile
whose present station is the result of conscientiously holding these beliefs
before they were recognized legally. Anything less would seem to be an
empty gesture.
SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND RETROACTIVITY
Prior to 1965, the Supreme Court's views on whether declaring
a statute to be unconstitutional should be retroactive were unclear. In
Ex parte Siebold," the Supreme Court held that if a statute is declared
unconstitutional, a prior conviction under that statute would be void.
But in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank,4 the
Supreme Court reversed a circuit court decision which had declared void
a judgment rendered under an unconstitutional statute. The Court held
that
[t]he actual existence of a statute, prior to such a deter-
mination, is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. 6
Since the Chicot County decision concerned a civil statute and is dis-
tinguishable from the Siebold dictum which involved a criminal statute,
there has been no direct holding by the Supreme Court whether those
who are convicted under a criminal statute subsequently declared un-
constitutional are entitled to have their convictions voided.47 The Supreme
Court has, however, spoken extensively on whether the subsequent
unconstitutionality of a statute regulating criminal procedure should
result in retroactive application. The holdings indicate that the Supreme
Court will not apply a new decision retroactively unless it would remedy
a criminal procedure which had compromised the reliability of the fact
finding process."' When a constitutional guarantee has been heightened
or added to in a manner which improves the reliability of the finding of
guilt, the new interpretation essentially establishes a new required level
44. 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1880) (dictum).
45. 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
46. Id. at 373.
47. See People v. Tannenbaom, 23 N.Y.2d 753, 244 N.E.2d 269, 296 N.Y.S.2d 798
(1968). Cf. Deckhard v. United States, 381 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1967) ; Warring v. Colpoys,
122 F.2d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 678 (1941).
48. Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term Forward: The High Court, the Great
Writ and Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965).
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of confidence that a man has committed a crime. By raising the degree
of confidence in guilt required to constitutionally convict a man, it may
be that a person convicted in the past would not be guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt under the present standards and should not be kept in
prison."
A number of lower federal courts, however, have extended the
situations in which retroactivity is allowed, and have held that Marchetti
v. United States,"0 Grosso v. United States,5 Haynes v. United States"
and Leary v. United States" should be applied retroactively.5" The
rationale of these cases seems to be that although the fifth amendment
privilege of self-incrimination does not sharpen the fact finding process,
it would bar any conviction under the unconstitutional statutes if those
previously convicted were tried today, because they stand convicted of
actions the government can no longer constitutionally punish.
A similar doctrine of retroactivity is apparent in some lower federal
court selective service cases. The Supreme Court decided in Gutknecht
v. United States" and Breen v. Selective Service Board No. x6"8 that
draft boards may not accelerate a registrant's induction date for failure
to comply with selective service laws. The Court stated that such power
exercised at the discretion of the local board and not by the courts is
"not congenial to our lawmaking traditions.Y57
In Andre v. Resor"8 and United States v. Kelly,5" Gutknecht and
49. Id. at 79-83.
50. 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (holding that to require payment of a wagering tax where
there was likelihood that such payment would result in prosecution for violation of
gambling statutes was a denial of the privilege not to incriminate oneself).
51. 390 U.S. 62 (1968) (holding that to require payment of a wagering excise tax
where there was likelihood that such payment would result in prosecution for violation of
gambling statutes was a denial of the privilege not to incriminate oneself).
52. 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (holding that to require payment of a tax on certain classes
of firearms used principally by persons engaged in unlawful activities denies the privi-
lege to be free from self-incrimination).
53. 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (holding that requiring the payment of a marihuana tax
before marihuana can be purchased violates the fifth amendment).
54. Santos v. United States, 417 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1969), vacated, 397 U.S. 46
(1970) (holding Leary retroactive) ; United States v. Lucia, 416 F.2d 920 (5th Cir.
1969) (holding Marchetti and Grosso retroactive) ; United States v. Miller, 406 F.2d 1100
(4th Cir. 1969) (holding Haynes retroactive). Contra, Graham v. United States, 407
F.2d 1313 (6th Cir. 1969) (holding Marchetti and Grosso are not retroactive) ; Jones v.
United States, 305 F. Supp. 465 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (holding Leary is not retroactive);
Horton v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Conn. 1969) (holding Haynes is not
retroactive).
55. 396 U.S. 295 (1970).
56. 396 U.S. 460 (1970).
57. Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295, 306 (1970).
58. 313 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
59. 314 F. Supp. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Swartz v. United States, 3 S.S.
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Breen were applied retroactively. In Andre, the petitioner's induction
date was accelerated for his failure to keep his draft board informed of
his current address, and he was subsequently inducted. One year after
his induction and one month after the Gutknecht decision, Andre filed
a petition for habeas corpus.6" The court decided that Andre had not
waived his right to raise Gutknecht by submitting to induction because
"one cannot waive a right of which he has no knowledge." 1 The court
further held that Gutknecht should be given retroactive effect, reasoning
that if a new rule of law will prevent the conviction of innocent persons,
as Gutknecht does, it should be given full retroactivity. As a result,
Andre was given a full discharge from the military.
In United States v. Kelly,62 the petitioner's induction was accelerated
for failure to possess his selective service registration card. He was
notified to report for induction, refused induction, was indicted and
was sentenced upon his guilty plea to three years imprisonment. This
was more than one and one-half years before the Gutknecht decision.
Kelly moved to vacate the sentence and judgment of conviction 3 and
the motion was granted. The court held that
[t]he purpose of the Breen and Gutknecht decision, viewed
broadly, is immaterial to the reliability of the fact finding pro-
cedures leading to a conviction. The concern is not with the
facts on which the conviction was based, but, rather, the
principle that the trial should never have taken place. The
principle goes beyond and is paramount to any question of
fairness of a trial and the presence of "other safeguards." It
is difficult to conceive of any valid reason why Breen and
Gutknecht should not be applied retroactively."'
Retroactivity of selective services cases was carried further in Ramos
v. United States.65 Ramos applied for conscientious objector classifica-
tion based on ethical and moral convictions. He was denied the exemption
and consequently refused induction. Ramos was convicted for refusing
induction and was sentenced to two and one-half years' imprisonment in
L.R. 3424 (C.D. Cal. 1970) ; Mikesell v. United States, 3 S.S.L.R. 3390 (W.D. Mich.
1970) ; George v. Sec'y of Defense, 3 S.S.L.R. 3389 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964).
61. Andre v. Resor, 313 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. Cal. 1970). See also Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
62. 314 F. Supp. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
64. United States v. Kelly, 314 F. Supp. 500, 509 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
65. 319 F. Supp. 1207 (D.R.I. 1970).
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October of 1968.66 In 1970, Ramos maintained that the criteria for C.O.
exemption had been changed in Welsh, entitling Ramos to have his
conviction and sentence vacated. The court decided that Ramos' beliefs
were consistent with those endorsed in Welsh and held that Welsh
should be applied retroactively to Ramos because it would be senseless
to deny the petitioner relief merely because he happened to be prosecuted
before the decision in Welsh, when his conviction was based upon a
statutory interpretation which the Supreme Court had since determined
to be incorrect. In short, the local board simply applied the wrong
standard. The court found the petitioner was not foreclosed from pressing
a collateral attack upon his conviction. Furthermore, the court found
compelling reasons to retroactively apply the holding in Welsh which, if
it did not eliminate the statutorily required religious content for con-
scientious objector classification, at least interpreted the criterion so
expansively that there would be no basis in fact for the local board's
action if the petitioner's case were to be decided for the first time today."
The trend of these lower federal courts to broaden the grounds for
holding a Supreme Court decision retroactive is an unexpected but de-
served benefit to inductees and federal prisoners, including those whose
inductions were punitively accelerated and those whose claims for con-
scientious objector exemption were denied because their grounds were
not religious but merely ethical or moral. If, as these federal courts have
held, relief should not be denied merely because a petitioner happened to
be inducted or convicted before the statute convicting him was re-
interpreted or declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, it would
seem that permitting selective objection on religious, secular or legal
grounds could result in exemption for not only those selective C.O.'s
eligible for the draft but also possible release through collateral attack
for those in the military or in prison. Gillette, however, denies selective
conscientious objection based on religion. Welsh's definition of religion
seems to preclude any claims on secular grounds. In addition, it is difficult
to be optimistic about relief for those who conscientiously object to the
war in Vietnam on ethical, moral, religious or legal grounds until the
extension of retroactivity becomes more general and the illegality of an
undeclared war question is answered. If, as many suggest, even those
who have deserted the military or fled federal jurisdiction deserve a
before-the-fact opportunity to claim selective C.O. status, it would not be
available under the collateral attack approach presented by the lower
66. 50 U.S.C. § 462 (Supp. III, 1968).
67. Ramos v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 1207, 1219 (D.R.I. 1970).
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federal courts.
It appears that if selective conscientious objection is to become a
reality for those eligible for the draft, those who have been inducted,
those who are in federal prison for refusing induction and those in exile
in foreign countries, it must come from the legislature or the executive.
SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND H.R. 832
If Congress were to permit selective conscientious objection under
the conditions now required for conscientious objection, there should be
no opposition on constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court has held
that
[t]he conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation
to bear arms in obedience to no constitutional provision, express
or implied; but because, and only because, it has accorded
with the policy of Congress thus to relieve him . . . . The
privilege of the native-born conscientious objector to avoid
bearing arms comes not from the Constitution but from the
acts of Congress . . . . [t]hat body may grant or withhold
the exemption as . . . it sees fit ... ..
Clearly, the exemption for conscientious objectors is a "creature of
Congress" and judging by Justice Marshall's dictum in Gillette, that the
Court did not suggest that Congress would be acting irrationally or
unreasonably if it exempted those who object to a particular war, the
Supreme Court seems to suggest it would approve such legislation.6"
Legislation of this type has been introduced in the House of Represen-
tatives."0 Section 1 of H.R. 832 would amend section 6(j) of the
Military Selective Service Act of 1967" by deleting the phrase "war
in any form" and inserting "in any form in all wars or a particular war."
Persons granted this selective C.O. exemption could request assignment
either to noncombatant military service or civilian service in the national
interest as is done under the current law.
The valid secular purposes for permitting conscientious objection to
all wars mentioned in Gillette apply equally to permitting selective con-
scientious objection. Justice Marshall admits that all but two of his
68. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623 (1930).
69. But the legislative power to grant or deny a privilege does not imply a fortiori
an equivalent power to grant or deny such a privilege on unconstitutional grounds.
See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
70. H.R. 832, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The bill was referred to the House
Committee on Armed Services, January 22, 1971.
71. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (Supp. IV, 1968).
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neutral reasons for granting exemption to total C.O.'s apply also to selec-
tive C.O.'s. The reasons the Court gives for not allowing selective C.O.
status seem unconvincing at least. To say that the Government's need for
manpower is a reason to deny selective C.O. exemption is to admit that it
is a possible $10,000 fine and 5 years' imprisonment72 and not popular
support which has enabled the government to pursue its military course in
Vietnam. The interest in maintaining a fair system for determining who
serves when not all serve seems to imply that the draft boards are having
a very difficult time as it is with the loopholes in the draft law. Conse-
quently, the government must deny what the selective C.O. believes is his
right to obey what he conscientiously feels is his duty to a power higher
than the state for no other reason than administrative expedience-ap-
parently draft boards cannot be both fair and efficient. To allow selective
conscientious objection through H.R. 832 would be to give legislative
acknowledgment to what Vietnam has made painfully apparent. One can
believe that he must never under any circumstances do a certain thing
while another may believe that he must not do it except under certain rare
and compelling circumstances. In both cases, the belief can be completely
conscientious, and theoretically it is conscientious objection that the law
seeks to protect. To require that conscientious objection extend to all
war discriminates, therefore, among conscientious objectors by the con-
tent of their beliefs and denies freedom of belief to those who conscien-
tiously object to certain wars. As Justice Jackson stated :
If there is any fixed star in our Constitutional constellation,
it is that no official high or petty can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in religion . . . or force citizens to confess by
word or deed their faith therein.7
In addition to the legal implications, it may well be argued that
an important social benefit will be realized from permitting selective con-
scientious objection. This could serve as a type of safety-valve veto for the
nation as a whole. If it is possible for citizens in their private capacities to
refuse participation in what honestly appears to them as an immoral,
unethical or irreligious course of action on the part of their government,
the impetuosity of political leaders who espouse force instead of negotia-
tion could be somewhat restrained. In effect, it would seem that America
would not demur at a time of crisis, but if large masses of citizens cannot
conscientiously engage in a war, that, logically, would seem a valid
72. Id.
73. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
74. Id. at 642.
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reason for the nation not to engage in that war. "
H.R. 832 AND RETROACTIVITY
Section two of H.R. 832 provides for an addition to section 12(a) of
the Military Selective Service Act of 19676 to make the selective
C.O. status granted in section one of H.R. 832 completely retroactive.
To be eligible for this retroactive application the applicant must have
been a selective C.O. either when he received his induction notice or
when he left federal jurisdiction to avoid induction or prosecution.
Those who left federal jurisdiction to avoid prosecution for refusing or
evading military service and return to claim a selective C.O. exemption
could not be arrested or prosecuted until the final administrative authority
denies the claim, but at that time they would be subject to immediate
arrest by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Should a prisoner's claim
be denied, he would be returned to prison, and should an inductee's claim
be denied, he would be returned to the military."7
This bill, combined with Welsh, would exempt anyone who con-
scientiously objected to the Vietnam war on ethical, religious or moral
grounds. It would also mean that the enlarged scope of retroactivity ap-
plied in the lower federal courts"8 would be granted to selective C.O. ap-
plicants. But by far the most prominent feature of H.R. 832 is the relief it
would extend to those who left the United States to escape prosecution for
refusing or evading military service" and those who deserted the
military.8" It is possible that those in prison and those inducted into the
military could have secured their release if selective C.O. status were
allowed under the retroactive grounds enunciated in Kelly and Ramos,
but to extend retroactivity to young men who have violated federal law
and never been tried or convicted is novel. No amnesty grant by the feder-
al government has ever gone this far. The amnesty proclamations follow-
ing the Civil War denied amnesty to "[a]ll who resigned or tendered re-
signations of their commissions in the army or navy of the United States
to evade duty in resisting the rebellion."' President Coolidge's amnesty
proclamation following World War I granted amnesty and pardon to
75. 207 NATION 11, 12-15 (1968).
76. 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (Supp. IV, 1968).
77. Rep. Edward I. Koch (Dem. N.Y.), statement before the House Armed Serv-
ices Committee on the subject of an all-volunteer army and selective conscientious ob-
jection, March 3, 1971.
78. See notes 44-67 supra and accompanying text.
79. This relief is available only if they were selective conscientious objectors when
they left the country.
80. This relief is availible only if they were selective conscientious objectors at the
time of their induction.
81. Presidential Proclamation of May 29, 1865, no. 37, § 5, 13 Stat. 758.
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only those who had deserted the military after the armistice was signed."
President Truman's Amnesty Board" was restricted to granting amnesty
to those who had been convicted for violating the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940.4 H.R. 832 goes farther than mere forgiveness;
it enables the federal government to admit that not allowing selective
conscientious objection was unjust.85 As one writer has suggested:
[E]veryone who has opposed the war-and this includes a clear
majority of Americans according to polls since September 1968
-should sense some common cause with the resisters and
deserters. These young men are guilty of no crime other than
that of sharing the opinion held by a majority of Americans,
although they arrived at the opinion ahead of the majority.
The crucial difference is that these men were 18 to 26 years
old. They could not oppose the war in theoretical comfort, nor
could they feel that they had done their duty simply by showing
up for a few anti-war demonstrations. The brute fact is that these
young men took a position which most . . shared, but are
in a situation where faithfulness to that position makes them
subject to legal reprisal.88
H.R. 832 would rectify this situation and allow the selective con-
scientious objector to be treated by the law as it should have been, not
as it was.
However, to expect the exiled selective conscientious objector to risk
a prison sentence and fine on the possibility of receiving just treatment
from his draft board is fatuous. Those in prison and in the military will
have nothing to lose and everything to gain by applying for release under
H.R. 832, but not so the exile. Realistically, it seems that the distaste of
some local draft boards for conscientious objectors must be remedied
before any of the beneficiaries of H.R. 832 will have any more than a
theoretical hope for a fair hearing. 7 Therefore, those who would have
82. Presidential Proclamation of March 5, 1924, 43 Stat. 1940.
83. Exec. Order No. 9814, 3 C.F.R. 594 (Supp. 1946).
84. Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885.
85. Rep. Edward I. Koch, supra note 77, at 4.
86. 210 NATION 145 (1970).
87. This ill-feeling and, in some cases, hostility toward C.O.'s has been acknowl-
edged in Rabin, Do You Believe in a Supreme Being-The Administration of Conscien-
tious Objector Exemption, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 642; Macgill, Selective Conscientious Objec-
tion: Divine Will and Legislative Grace, 54 VA. L. Ray. 1355, 1380 (1968). It has been
statistically documented in J. DAVIs & K. DOLBEARE, LITTLE GRoups OF NEIGHBORS: THE
SELEcTr E SEwvicE SYSTEm 93 (1968).
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the best chance for relief under H.R. 832 would seem to be those who
had previously requested and been denied C.O. exemption by their local
boards on the grounds made valid by this bill. They would probably have
little trouble convincing the board that they have remained believers in
selective conscientious objection. But the applicant who was aware that
selective conscientious objectors did not qualify for exemption and thought
it futile to apply may have difficulty in convincing his local board that he
was a selective C.O. when he received his induction notice or when he left
the country. As well as having to prove himself to have been a sincere
selective C.O. before the bill, he must convince the local board that he is
a sincere selective C.O. now. The applicant bears the burden of establish-
ing prima facie compliance with the sincerity requirement.8 Once such
a case has been made, the Selective Service System has the burden of
showing something in the record to support a denial," but the process
itself seems less than fair. The C.O. exemption is determined chiefly
upon the sincerity of the registrant's beliefs." This requirement poses
the greatest difficulty for local boards and registrants and many different
facts may cast doubt on an applicant's truthfulness and be the basis of a
denial of exemption. As one court has stated, "[t]he best evidence [of a
registrant's sincerity] may well be, not [his] statements or those of
other witnesses but his credibility and demeanor in a personal appear-
ance."91 A board can base a finding of insincerity upon nothing more than
the applicant's nervous appearance or unreliable demeanor as long as the
disbelief is honest and rational. 2 When one considers that this applicant is
faced with returning to prison, or to the military, or with immediate arrest
by the F.B.I., it can be seen that the applicant may be nervous and inartic-
ulate. Nervousness and inarticulatness could easily and honestly be mis-
taken for an evasive demeanor by the local board, and consequently the
applicant's claim may be mistakenly denied. In the applicant's appeal to the
state board, 3 the applicant may rebut in writing allegedly incorrect con-
clusions.9" However, the appeals board is quite justified in believing the
local board and denying the C.O. exemption. Until 1967, the Department
of Justice and the F.B.I. conducted an independent investigation for the
88. 32 C.F.R. § 1623.2 (1970).
89. A. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
90. SHAPIRO & STRIKER, MASTERING THE DRAFT § 12.3.3 (1970).
91. United States v. Simmons, 213 F. Supp. 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'd on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 397 (1955). See also United States v. Sinclair, 293 F. Supp. 337
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
92. United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d 808 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884
(1960).
93. 32 C.F.R. § 1626 (1970).
94. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.12 (1970).
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appeals board and substantially mitigated the harshness of the system.95
This provided a de novo hearing on the merits of the claim. But this was
discontinued under the present law ;"8 now the question of an applicant's
sincerity is not subject to judicial review or federal investigation."'
With the issue of an applicant's sincerity wholly within the local
board's discretion and not subject to judicial review, it is apparent that
local boards are given the final say under H.R. 832 to decide who shall
receive the benefit of the retroactivity section. But this puts the applicant
at the mercy of the very agency which precipitated the applicant's exile,
imprisonment or military confinement.
The local boards, by the Selective Service System's own admission,
"bring little sympathy into the consideration of these cases,"" so it
would seem that any skepticism is justified.
Those who have a past record of selective conscientious objection
with their draft boards will probably fare well under H.R. 832, but those
whose selective C.O. beliefs were not made known to their draft boards at
the time they fled the United States or received their induction notices are
at an extreme disadvantage. It is suggested that unless an investigation
or inquiry is permitted to ascertain an applicant's sincerity as was done
prior to 1967, H.R. 832 offers little to those without a documented
history of selective conscientious objection.
Perhaps it would be better to follow the idea of President Truman's
Amnesty Board9 and appoint a board to investigate the case of each
applicant in conjunction with the Department of Justice and then recom-
mend or deny exemption on this basis.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to deny that for America to enjoy domestic peace, not
only must the United States involvement in Indo-China cease, but all
the boys must be brought home. If it is possible that any good can be
derived from this war, it is that the conscientious, belief that a certain war
is immoral, unethical or in contravention of religion must be above and
beyond the power of the government to raise and support armies. As
was stated by Judge Wyzanski in United States v. Sisson :109
95. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (Supp.
IV, 1968, formerly ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604 (1948).
96. Id.
97. See White, Processing Conscientious Objector Claims: A Constitutional In-
quiry, 56 CAL. L. REv. 652, 653-60 (1968).
98. Id. at 674 n.86.
99. Exec. Order No. 9814, 3 C.F.R. 594 (Supp. 1946).
100. 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal dismissed, 390 U.S. 267 (1970).
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When the state through its laws tries to override reason-
able moral commitments it makes a dangerously uncharacteris-
tic choice . . . . When the law treats a reasonable, conscien-
tious act as a crime it . . . invites civil disobedience. It impairs
the very habits which nourish and preserve the law.'
Only if the government admits its mistake in denying selective con-
scientious objection and extends it without prejudice to those who
deserved it before or are entitled to it now, can America gain anything
from all that has been lost in Southeast Asia.
APPENDIX
H.R. 832
(i) Any person who received a notice to report for induction into the
Armed Forces prior to the date of enactment of this Act shall be entitled
to offer information to his local board in substantiation of his claim to
exemption-
(A) from combatant training and service in the Armed Forces
provided he was conscientiously opposed to participation in
a particular war at the time he received such notice; or
(B) from both combatant and noncombatant training and
service in the Armed Forces provided he was conscientiously
opposed to participating in any form in a particular war at the
time he received such notice.
He shall be entitled to make his claim to exemption whether or not he
has previously offered any information in substantiation of a claim to
be a conscientious objector. The grant or improper denial of his claim
shall be a defense to any prosecution for refusing or evading service in
the Armed Forces.
(ii) Any person who left a jurisdiction prior to the date of enactment
of this Act with intent to avoid prosecution for refusing or evading
service in the Armed Forces and who returns to such jurisdiction shall be
entitled to offer information to his local board in substantiation of his
claim of exemption-
(A) from combatant training and service in the Armed Forces
provided he was conscientiously opposed to participation in
a particular war at the time he left such jurisdiction; or
(B) from both combatant and noncombatant training and
101. Id. at 910-11.
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service in the Armed Forces provided he was conscientiously
opposed to participating in any form in a particular war at the
time he left such jurisdiction.
He shall not be prosecuted for the violation of any Federal law arising
out of the act of having left such jurisdiction with intent to avoid
prosecution for refusing or evading service in the Armed Forces unless
he is finally convicted for refusing or evading service in the Armed
Forces.
(iii) Any prosecution for refusing or evading service in the Armed
Forces of a person who has offered information in substantiation of
his claim to exemption under subparagraph (i) or (ii) of this para-
graph shall be suspended until his claim to exemption has been granted
or denied, including the final disposition of all administrative appeals
taken with respect to such claim. The grant or improper denial of his
claim for exemption shall be a defense to such prosecution.
(iv) Any person convicted prior to the date of enactment of this Act
for refusing or evading service in the Armed Forces shall be entitled
to make a motionEl] . . . for temporary release on the ground that he
has offered information in substantiation of his claim to exemption under
subparagraph (i) or (ii) of this paragraph. . . . He shall be entitled
to make a motion El sl . . . for permanent release on the ground his claim
has been granted or improperly denied.
(v) Any person inducted into the Armed Forces prior to the date of
enactment of this Act shall be entitled to offer information to his local
board in substantiation of his claim to exemption under subparagraph
(i) of this paragraph.. [141
(vi) Any prosecution commenced prior to the date of enactment of this
Act for acts arising out of a nonviolent refusal or evasion of continued
service in the Armed Forces 0 51 . . . of a person who has offered in-
formation in substantiation of his claim to exemption under subpara-
graph (i) . . . shall be suspended until his claim . . . has been granted
or denied including the final disposition of all administrative appeals.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
103. Id.
104. Pending the final disposition of his claim to exemption, he shall be employed
in duties which involve minimum conflict with his beliefs. The improper denial or grant
of his claim to exemption shall constitute grounds for release from the Armed Forces
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964).
105. The offenses include but are not limited to violations of 10 U.S.C. § 885
(1964) (desertion from the Armed Forces) ; 10 U.S.C. § 886 (1964) (absence without
leave) ; and 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1964) (failure to obey an order or regulation).
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The grant or improper denial of his claim to exemption shall be a defense
to such prosecution.
(vii) Any person convicted prior to the date of enactment of this Act
for acts arising out of a nonviolent refusal or evasion of continued service
in the Armed Forces . . 61 shall be entitled to apply for temporary
release . .[107 on the ground that he has offered information in sub-
stantiation of his claim to exemption under subparagraph (i) . ... He
shall be temporarily released for noncombatant duties until his claim
to exemption has been granted or denied, including . . administrative
appeals taken . . . He shall be entitled to apply for permanent release
S. * [108 on the ground that his claim to exemption has been granted or
improperly denied.
106. 10 U.S.C. §§ 885, 886, 892 (1964).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964).
108. Id.
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